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Abstract— The privacy protection of the biometric data is an
important research topic, especially in the case of distributed
biometric systems. In this scenario, it is very important to
guarantee that biometric data cannot be steeled by anyone, and
that the biometric clients are unable to gather any information
different from the single user verification/identification. In a
biometric system with high level of privacy compliance, also
the server that processes the biometric matching should not
learn anything on the database and it should be impossible for
the server to exploit the resulting matching values in order to
extract any knowledge about the user presence or behavior.
Within this conceptual framework, in this paper we propose
a novel complete demonstrator based on a distributed biometric
system that is capable to protect the privacy of the individuals
by exploiting cryptosystems. The implemented system computes
the matching task in the encrypted domain by exploiting homo-
morphic encryption and using Fingercode templates. The paper
describes the design methodology of the demonstrator and the
obtained results. The demonstrator has been fully implemented
and tested in real applicative conditions. Experimental results
show that this method is feasible in the cases where the privacy
of the data is more important than the accuracy of the system
and the obtained computational time is satisfactory.
I. INTRODUCTION
Biometric traits are more and more exploited for authenti-
cation and identification tasks in a multitude of applications
ranging from institutional, governance, police and com-
mercial systems. The use of biometric technologies within
such applications requires the protection of the biometrics
templates and the protection of the user privacy, as well [1].
In order to guarantee the user privacy, it is of paramount
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importance that the collected biometric information should
not be used for any other activities than the ones expressly
declared, and, at the same time, that the biometric system
is capable to protect and avoid any misuse of the biometric
information in [2].
The privacy protection of the biometric data is even much
more critical in the case of distributed biometric systems
since the biometric data are transmitted through a network
infrastructure and hence it is greatly reduced the direct user
control about her/his biometric information. In a distributed
biometric system with an high level of privacy compliance,
also the server that processes the biometric matching should
not learn anything on the database and it should be impos-
sible for the server to exploit the resulting matching values
in order to extract any knowledge about the user presence or
behavior.
In this paper, we refer to the general application where
a biometric client checks if the “fresh” captured fingerprint
belongs to the database of authorized entities managed by
a biometric server. In order to preserve the users privacy,
we require that the biometric client trusts the server to
correctly perform the matching algorithm for the fingerprint
recognition and it also should not learn anything about the
fingerprint templates stored in the server with the exception
of the resulting matching process. On the biometric server
side, we want to guarantee that it is not possible to get any
information about the requested biometry and even also the
resulting matching value. This working hypothesis is very
important since it allows to avoid any tracking and logging
activity of the user presence and behavior on the server side.
Within this conceptual framework, in this paper we pro-
pose a novel complete demonstrator and the related design
methodology. This demonstrator is capable to deal with
distributed biometric systems protecting the privacy of the
individuals by exploiting cryptosystems. The implemented
system computes the matching task in the encrypted domain
by exploiting homomorphic encryption and using the finger-
print templates proposed by A. K. Jain called Fingercode
[3]. In particular, in this paper we propose the design of
all the step required to implement the demonstrator while a
complete discussion about the cryptographic aspects of the
adopted protocol is available in [4].
In the proposed demonstrator, the biometric client captures
the user fingerprint trait and it processes the obtained sample
in order to produce the related Fingercode template (Fig. 1).
Fingercode
Computation
Data
Sampling
Homomorphic
Encription
Response
Extraction
Response
Encoding
Encrypted
Matching
Identity
Client Server
DB
Fig. 1. Scheme of the proposed demonstrator.
The underling cryptographic protocol accepts in input only
integer values, hence a data sampling operation is needed
in order to suitably convert the floating point elements of
the Fingercode template in integer values. The quantization
step of the Fingercode template is critical since it effects the
final accuracy of the overall system and the final requested
bandwidth. A discussion of the design of the quantization
step is given in the following sections.
In the proposed demonstrator, the fresh biometric template
is sent to the biometric server in the encrypted format and
the server returns the identity information in the encrypted
format as well (or just a boolean outcome for the authenti-
cation request). Hence, on the server side (the right subplot
in Figure 1), it is not possible to extract or determine any
personal information on the biometric data of the users
during all the phases of the verification / identification
procedures. Further details on the encryption methods used
in the demonstrator will be given in the related section of
the paper.
The contribute of the paper is twofold. At the best of
our knowledge, no such complete demonstrator has been
proposed yet in the literature. Moreover, the paper presents a
complete discussion of the design methodology dealing with
all theoretical and implementation aspects of demonstrator
with specific reference to the effects of Fingercode quanti-
zation on the template size, final accuracy and bandwidth
of the system. Experimental results show that the proposed
method is feasible in the cases where the privacy of the
data is more important than the accuracy of the system.
Obtained performance in terms of accuracy, efficiency and
used bandwidth are satisfactory.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, the
state of the art of the privacy protection of the biometric data
is resumed. Section III presents the proposed demonstrator
and the related design methodology, then in Section IV
we discuss the implementation and the demonstrator, its
accuracy and performance evaluation in different applicative
conditions, and the obtained results.
II. PREVIOUS WORK
The objective of the most of the systems for the privacy
protection of the biometric data in the literature is to modify
the stored biometric templates for denying the access to these
data to unauthorized persons. These methods can be divided
in four different categories.
• Biohashing: the biometric features are transformed
using a function defined by a user-specific key or
password. Usually this transformation is invertible. The
system proposed in [5] is based on the face, but similar
techniques can be applied to different biometric traits
(e.g. iris and fingerprint [6]).
• Noninvertible transform: the biometric template is se-
cured by applying a noninvertible transformation func-
tion to it. There are methods based on different biomet-
ric traits. For example, in [7] it is used the fingerprint,
and in [8] the iris. The main problem is that it is
necessary to study the tradeoff between discriminability
and noninvertibility of the transformation function. In
[9] is presented a study on the measurement of the
noninvertibility of methods based on the fingerprint.
• Key-binding biometric cryptosystem: the template is
secured by applying cryptographic algorithms. Usually,
the system must compute a transformation of the en-
crypted templates in the plain domain. This task is
usually time expansive. Examples of methods used by
this approach are the fuzzy commitment scheme [10]
and the fuzzy vault [11].
• Key generating biometric cryptosystem: these meth-
ods compute the cryptographic key directly from the
biometric data (e.g. [12]). The main problem is that it is
difficult to generate keys with high stability and entropy.
This approach can also be useful in other applications
(e.g. in [13]).
Furthermore, there are methods applicable to multi-
biometric system (e.g. in [14]). Unfortunately, in the most
of the cases, the obtained accuracy is decreased by the
transformation method.
In the literature, there are other methods for the protection
of the privacy of the template Fingercode. For example, in
[15] a method based on fuzzy vault is used and in [16] a
biohashing transformation is applied. Our method encrypts
the data with robust algorithms and the encryption does not
impact to the accuracy because we use an homomorphic
cryptosystem.
A similar approach to the privacy preserving authenti-
cation through biometric measures but applied to the face
recognition is used in [17], [18]: the former makes use of
homomorphic encryption, as in the present work, but presents
a rounds complexity that is logarithmic in the number of
the verified features and a huge bandwidth requirement; the
latter is more efficient and bandwidth saving (with constant
round complexity) and exploits the use of both homomorphic
encryption and Garbled Circuits [19].
There are also systems that can compute the Hamming
distance between biometric templates (e.g. Iriscode [20]) that
are use homomorphic encryption methods. For example, the
system in [21] is based on the Blum-Goldwasser cryptosys-
tem, the system in [22] on the Goldwasser-Micali scheme,
the system in [23] on the method on homomorphic properties
of Goldwasser-Micali and Paillier cryptosystems, the system
in [24] on the ElGamal scheme and Garbled Circuits.
There are also systems that secure the data by distributing
the tasks of classifiers based on computational intelligence
techniques in the server and client side. In [25], [26] a
method based on Support Vector Machines (SVM) is used.
The main drawback of this system is that requires a prelim-
inary training phase.
III. THE DESIGN OF THE DEMONSTRATOR
The proposed approach can be applied in distributed
biometric systems in verification/identification tasks. With-
out any lack of generality, in the following we present
the implementation of the method for the identification
procedure. On the client side (left subplot, Figure 1), the
biometric sample is captured and then computed in order
to obtain the related Fingercode template [3] (Template
Creation step). Then, the floating point elements of the
Fingercode template are sampled and converted to integers
in order to allow the adoption of the following encryption
method (Template Quantization step). The important effects
on the final accuracy and bandwidth of this step will be
further discussed in the following subsections. The reduced
template is now encrypted using the public-key of the client
and the biometric matching is processed on the server side
(right subplot, Figure 1) by an homomorphic cryptosystems
(Encrypted Matching step). The matching algorithms do not
transform the data in the plain domain. All computation
steps of the matching method (evaluation of the matching
value, thresholding and extraction of the best candidates) are
processed directly in the encrypted domain. Let us now detail
all the design steps of the proposed demonstrator.
A. Template Creation
The computation of the biometric template in the plain
domain is based on a method that uses the Fingercode
template. This method starts with the estimation of the
reference point that we implemented with the following
steps:
• Definition of the ROI as a ring with fixed size (height
H).
• The ROI is partitioned in NR rings and NA arcs,
obtaining NS = NR ×NA sectors Si.
• A bank of NF Gabor filters with different directions
is applied to the image obtaining NF filtered images
Fiθ (x, y). A symmetric Gabor filter has the following
general form in the spatial domain:
G (x, y; f, θ) = exp
{
−
1
2
[
x′2
σ2x′
+
y′2
σ2y′
]}
cos (2pifx′) ,
(1)
x′ = x sin θ + y cos θ, (2)
y′ = x cos θ − y sin θ, (3)
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Fig. 2. Scheme of the biometric recognition method based on the template
Fingercode.
where f is the frequency of the sinusoidal plane wave
along the direction θ from the x-axis, and σx′ and σy′
are the space constants of the Gaussian envelope along
x′ and y′ axes, respectively.
• The Average Absolute Deviation (AAD) from the mean
of gray values in individual sectors in filtered images
is computed to define the feature vector that represent
the biometric template. The value Viθ of the template
related to each sector of each filtered image is computed
as:
Viθ = (1/ni)
(
ni∑
1
|Fiθ (x, y)− Fiθ|
)
(4)
where ni is the number of pixels in Si and Piθ is the
mean of pixel values Piθ of Fiθ (x, y) in sector Si.
The obtained feature vector is composed by NV = NS ×
NF values (for example in [3], NV ranges from 640 to 896
according to the used fingerprint dataset). This method is not
rotational invariant. For this reason, during the enroll phase,
Nθ templates related to different rotations of the original
image are computed. The match-score from two templates
consists in the minimum Euclidean distance between the Nθ
enrolled templates and the live template. We used Nθ =
9, rotating the sample in a range from -45◦ to 45◦ with a
constant step equal to 11.25◦. This step reduces the problem
related to the bad placement of the finger on the sensor. Fig. 2
shows the schema of the Fingercode method.
It is well known in the literature that the estimation of
the reference point for the Fingercode template is a critical
task with respect to the final accuracy of the system (an
incorrect estimation of this point implies a different ROI
evaluation, causing an increasing of the identification errors).
We manually selected the reference point for each image in
order to create a supervised points dataset as reference, then
we applied different methods present in the literature in order
to study this effect and to reduce its impact. First of all, we
tested the identification of the reference point by selecting
the candidate points in the image with the highest Poincare
index [27], then we tested the a different method creating a
single Fingercode template for each candidate point. In any
case, if a fingerprint image does not present any singular
point, we consider the point with the maximum Poincare
index as the reference point. Since a complete discussion of
the effect of the reference point on the accuracy is outside
the scope of the paper, in the following we refer to the first
presented method.
B. Template Quantization
In order to limit the complexity of Fingercode matching
in the encrypted domain, we investigated the possibility of
reducing the number of features of the fingercode templates
and the number of bits used for the physical representation
of each value of the template. The effects of the reduction of
the number of features have been studied by appropriately
decimating the tesselation of the region of interest. We
tested different configurations of the algorithm: H , NR, NA,
NF . We preferred to use a fixed reduction strategy, instead
of methods that minimize the correlation among different
features, like principal component analysis, since the latter
should be optimized for each database and their application
in the encrypted domain would not be convenient. The
effects of quantization have been studied by converting each
value of the template into an integer number representable
with b bits, according to a uniform quantization criterion.
The performances of the different configurations have been
compared by evaluating the empirical distribution of the
distances of genuines and impostors after feature reduction
and quantization, from which we can compute receiver
operating characteristic (ROC) curves and equal error rate
(EER).
C. The Encryption Method
Our cryptographic protocol strongly relies on the notion of
(additively) homomorphic encryption. A public-key encryp-
tion scheme is said to be additively homomorphic if, given
the encryptions of two message a and b, the ciphertext of
a+b can be easily computed (for example, by multiplication)
from the two original cyphertexts without the knowledge of
the secret key.
Our solution makes use of two specific encryption
schemes: the Paillier’s encryption scheme [28] and a known-
variant of the ElGamal encryption scheme [29] but ported on
Elliptic Curves. The latter scheme is wisely used in order to
save further bandwidth.
D. The Matching Method in the Encrypted Domain
The protocol may be subdivided in three main steps to
be accomplished by the two parties (the client with the
biometric measure to authenticate and the server with an in-
clear database with all the features of the enrolled persons):
• vector extraction: on a first stage the target biometry
(i.e. the information acquired by the biometric device)
is “converted” by the client, using the methodologies
shown in this work, in a quantized characteristic feature
vector; this preliminary work is performed in clear and
only the resulting feature vector is encrypted and sent
to the server;
• distances computation: the distances (more specifically
the square of the Euclidean distance) between the target
vector and the vectors in the database are computed
in the ciphertext domain: this is done by the server
exploiting the homomorphic properties of the adopted
cryptosystems. The outcome of this phase consists of
the encryption of the required distances that still remain
unknown to the server. Differently from the original
Fingercode matching method, we decided to compute
the squared distance from two templates for reducing
the computational complexity.
• selection of the matching identities: in this final step
the server interacts with the client in order to select, in
the ciphertext domain, the enrolled identities with the
related distances that are below a known threshold. This
is accomplished through several internal sub-protocols
nevertheless keeping a constant round complexity. The
final outcome is kept secret to the server and is only
revealed to the client: it can consist of more than
one identity (if this is the case) where the previous
works [17], [18] just report the identity with the min-
imum distance. A simple variant allows the use of a
boolean outcome: authenticated/rejected.
Such solution has been formally proven to be secure
against an honest-but-curious adversary, where we assume
that he follows the protocol but may try to learn additional
information from the protocol trace beyond what can be
derived from the inputs and outputs of the algorithm when
used as a black-box. The final protocol has a constant round
complexity and a bandwidth usage that is better than the
works [17], [18] (when applied to the fingercode template).
More details on the protocol and on the performance com-
parison are available in [4]).
E. Individual Threshold
In many biometric systems, the use of individual threshold
values can produce a better final accuracy than a single
threshold value used for all enrolled individuals. This is
related to the fact that different training levels of the users
and skin conditions can be present in the dataset. Considering
a dataset D composed by N samples of M individuals, for
each individual i is assigned a different threshold value ti
that is used in the identity verification step of the biometric
recognition process. For each individual i, the distributions of
False Match (FMi) and False Non Match (FNMi) are com-
puted (with the corresponding individual EERi) considering
only the set of user templates Xi as the genuine template
set. All other samples of the dataset are considered as the
set of the impostor Ii = D ⊃ Xi. In our experiment, we set
the value ti as the threshold corresponding to the individual
Equal Error Rate (EERi). Differently, it is possible to set the
individual threshold value as the threshold that corresponds
to the Zero FMR or Zero FNMR. This important method can
be applied to the proposed demonstrator. The results of the
described methods are reported in Section IV.
(a) (b)
Fig. 3. Examples of test images.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DEMONSTRATOR AND
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We tested the proposed demonstrator by using a well
known public fingerprint dataset composed by 408 grayscale
fingerprint images acquired by a CrossMatch Verifier 300
sensor [30] [31]. The dataset contains 8 images for each in-
dividual with a resolution equal to 500 dpi and the dimension
of 512× 480 pixel. Figure 3 shows two examples of images
of the test database.
The application of the Individual Threshold method cited
in Section III-E is shown in Fig. 4 where different figures
of merits are reported with NV = 640. The overall accuracy
has been enhanced by reducing the initial EER (equals to
0.065) of a factor close to 0.5. In particular, we obtained a
ZeroFM rate with FMR=0.1653 and a ZeroFNM rate with
FMR=0.0512. This method can typically produce relevant
enhancement in overall accuracy when the samples belonging
to Dataset have not the same quality level. This is the case
of the proposed test dataset.
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Fig. 4. Results obtained by computing method of Individual Threshold.
As a second step, in order to test the effect of the number
of features in the Fingercode template we generated a total
of eight different configurations, corresponding to eight sets
of Fingercode vectors with length ranging from 640 features
(the original configuration) to 8 features. The parameters of
TABLE I
TESTED CONFIGURATIONS FOR FEATURE SIZE REDUCTION.
Configuration NV NF NR H (pixel) NA
A 640 8 5 20 16
B 384 8 4 25 12
C 192 8 3 20 8
D 96 4 3 33 8
E 48 4 3 33 4
F 32 4 2 50 4
G 16 4 2 50 2
H 8 2 2 50 2
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Fig. 5. Equal Error Rate of the different configurations.
the reduced tesselations for each configuration are detailed
in Table I.
For investigating the effects of the Template Quantization,
each configuration has been normalized and quantized using
a different number of bits, ranging from eight bits to a
single bit, producing a total of 5 × 8 = 40 quantized
configurations. The behavior of the EER for the testing
dataset is shown in Fig.5. From the above figure, it is evident
that the performance of the system is practically unaffected
by feature size reduction when the number of features is
above 96 and the number of bit is above 2. This suggested
to consider for further testing only the configurations C and
D, both quantized with 4 and 2 bits.
To evaluate the performances in bandwidth and computa-
tional complexity we implemented a client-server prototype
version of our construction written in C++, using the GMP
Library (version 5.0.1) and the PBC Library (version 0.5.8).
The experimental results were run on 2.4 GHz with 4 GB of
RAM PCs. The experimental results show that the proposed
method based on Fingercode templates and homomorphic
cryptosystem is feasible in the cases when the privacy of the
data is more important than the accuracy of the system, and
the obtained performances on accuracy measured as EER
are comparable to the original method. Table II shows the
obtained accuracy, the computational time and the bandwidth
required by the configurations C and D described in Table I,
each quantized with 2 and 4 bits.
We estimated the time required for the identification in the
encrypted domain using a dataset composed by 100 enrolled
individuals using a 80 bits security key. Table III reports
the obtained results. The time complexity of the underling
TABLE II
PERFORMANCE OF THE PROPOSED METHOD WITH A DATABASE OF 408 ENTRIES (3672 FEATURE VECTORS).
Parameters
Configuration Quantization Security EER Bandwidth (bit)
80 6568792
C 2 112 0.0758 10824021
128 14374232
80 7802584
C 4 112 0.0732 12527832
128 16313048
80 6902008
D 2 112 0.0715 11299320
128 14932856
80 8135800
D 4 112 0.0673 13003128
128 16871672
TABLE III
REQUIRED TIME FOR THE IDENTIFICATION IN THE ENCRYPTED DOMAIN
USING A DATASET COMPOSED BY 100 ENROLLED ENTRIES USING A 80
BITS SECURITY KEY.
Configuration Quantization Time (s)
C 2 44.43
4 53.66
D 2 37.43
4 45.58
protocol is linear in the number of enrolled identities.
As shown in Table II and Table III different performances
can be obtained varying the number of features of the tem-
plate and the number of bits used for representing each value.
On the other hand, the best computational performances can
be obtained with a small number of features and bits.
Fig. 6 plots the ROC curves of the configurations that
we consider as a good trade off. The performance of the
different configurations are very close each other, the effects
of both feature reduction and quantization being very limited
on the accuracy of the system. It is worth noting that the
original configuration, i.e., 640 features with floating point
implementation, reported an EER of 0.065333 on the testing
dataset, which is comparable with the performance of the
tested configurations.
The obtained final results of the system (in term of ERR
and ROC curves) show the proposed method is only slightly
worse than the results of the original Fingercode technique
applied on the same dataset, and that the privacy protection
implementation we proposed can be feasible in the cases
when the privacy of the data is more important than the
accuracy of the system. Unfortunately, the simplicity of the
matching function used in the Fingercode is suitable for
the processing in the encrypted domain, but it limits the
final accuracy of the system. In fact, much more accurate
methods capable to work with the same fingerprint dataset
are available in the literature, but their complexity excludes
the adoption in the proposed framework implemented in the
demonstrator.
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Fig. 6. ROC curves of the configurations of the proposed method that we
consider as the best suitable in real applicative conditions.
V. CONCLUSION
The paper presented the design of a demonstrator of an
approach to protect the privacy of the biometric data in
distributed biometric systems based on fingerprints. In the
proposed approach, on the client side, the biometric data
are captured and then an encrypted representation of the
template Fingercode is computed. We reduced the data con-
tained in the template for obtaining a smaller representation
of the encrypted template that should be shared with the
server. The encryption matching algorithm is based on the
homomorphic cryptosystems. The experimental results show
that the proposed approach has an equivalent accuracy with
respect the original Fingercode method. Improvements of
the security model will be considered in the future work by
applying encryption methods also on the biometric templates
stored in the database. This new security model is stronger
than the model proposed in this paper but it is also more
difficult to realize. The obtained computational time permits
the use of the proposed system in real applications. The main
drawback of this approach consists in the low accuracy of
the recognition method based on the Fingercode template
that permit the use of this system only in a limited subset
of security applications with respect to the state-of-the-art
methods based on minutiae.
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